Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

Harry Walters and Betty Walters v. Robert W.
Brandt : Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Walters v. Brandt, No. 9880 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4231

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPRE.MEtCOURT
OF _THE

STATE 0-F UTAH
HARRY WALTE-RS and
BETTY WALTE~RS, his wife,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.-

Case No.

9880
ROBERT W. BRAND,T,
Administrator of the Estate of
BarbaTa Best Pelly, appointed in Utah,

Defendwnt and Appellant.

BRIE-F OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMgNT OF THE KIND· OF CASE
Defendant and Appellant appeals to the Supreme
'Oourt of Utah from a jury verdict entered in the District
Court of Sevier County, August 17, 19'62, and the denial
of -Defendant's Motion for Nerw Trial. Plaintiffs were
awarded damages for personal injuries and property
damages resulting from an .automobile accident August
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22., 1953, involving a pickup truC!k driven by Plaintiff
Harry Walters and in which his wife, Betty Walters, was
a passenger, and an automob[ie approaching fro·m the
opposite direction driven by Barbara B~st Pelly, who
was killed in the ·~ccident and for whose estate the administrator was appointed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs.
D·efendant filed a timely motion for new trial which was
denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs and Respondents seek to have the judgment affirmed.
·
STATEMENT OF F AC:TS
August 22, 1953, at approximately 5:15 o'cloc:k, p.m.,
on U. S. Highway 89 in Sevier Co-unty, Utah, ·a 1953
Chevrolet automobile driven northerly by deceased, Barbara Best Pelly, and a 1953 Chevrolet pickup driven
southerly in the opposite direction by Plaintiff and Re-spondent Harry Walters, and in which his wife, Plaintiff
Betty W:alters_, was a passenger, collided.
The collision was head-on for all practical purposes~
the right front "corner" (R-211, Line 22) of the Walters
vehicle meeting the right f'ront "just ahead of the door
standard on the right side ... " (R-208, Line 22) (Photos,
Exhibit 5 ofPelly vehicle, Exhibit 6 of Walters vehicle),
as the latter vehicle, the Pelly vehicle angled "30 to 40°
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angle to the roadway ... " (R-208, Line 12) across the
highway into the opposing lane of travel.
· The point of impact was fiour feet from the center
of- Plaintiff's and Respondents' side of ·the highway; on
Defendant's wrong side of the highway. (R-212, Line 2)
Plaintiff Harry Walters testified that .as he approached the bridge, the scene of the accident, he was
on "my own side" of the street (R-109, Line 21) (R-110,
Line 14), and that he had been since leaving Aurora except for passing one car passed earlier (R-124, Line 24,
30; R-125, L;ine 5); that he " ... saw dust made by the
car," (R-111, Line 18) on the shoulder of the highway
beyond the bridge "about 130 yards away from me"
(R-112, Line 17), Plaintiff Harry Walters marking the
Plaintiff's map Exhibit 3 (R-115, Line 6) where the dust
arose, said point being where the physical evidence of
tire tracks revealed the Pelly car for some reason, control
or otherwise, was off the shoulder (officer's testimony,
R-179, Line 20) It's speed was such that the Walters
vehicle, itself traveling forty-five miles per hour (R-108,
Line 21) was knocked backward ten feet (R-188, Line
7), su:ffic,-ient that shortly before it passed a vehicle going
in the same direction between forty-five and fifty (R-144,
Line 13), that of the witness Averett, got ahead of the
Averett automobile by one mile .at one time and 1{ept
ahead of the Averett vehicle going "around that mileage
[50]" (R-147, Line 20), Averett, however, having told the
officer he was going the maximum (sixty miles per hour),
when passed by the Pelly vehicle (R-201, Line 126). Then
the Pelly automobile "veered sharply off the road so the
wheels got off the shoulder there and it made a sharp
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turn and shot across the bridge." (R-145, Line 21) (In
the words of the witness Averett.) Contrary to the state'"
ment uf fact in Defendant's brief, Page 3, Paragraph 3,
Averett could not testify as to the position of the Pl:aintiff Walters' vehicle at the time of the impact, Averett
not being ·able to see the Walters' vehicle. (R-156, Line 7)

Q. At the time the car collided were you able to
see the pickup truck~
A. No, sir.
(roso R-146, Line 23)

Q But at that point you couldn't see the Walte'rs
car~

A. That's true.
The witness Averett testified (R-151, L·ine 7) he
could see no ind:iication of any marks left by the Pelly
car, though the highway patrolman, Ted Hansen, caTefully charted same (R-179·, Page· 18) and they appeared
on the photographs. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
witne·ss A vere~tt testified indicating he worried over
marks on the highw·ay under the pickup after same had
come to rest and after he had gone to summon help
(R-159, Line 18); these marks were determined by the
patrolman to " ... not pertain to either of the two vehicles
involved in this accident." (R-186, Line 15)
Ave'rett, however, 0ontended had there been any such
mar:ks from the Pelly ;car he would have seen them.
(R-165, Line 21)
As to the witness Roberts' testimony concerning a
third car being passed by the Pl:aintiff Walters and
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5
which supposedly stopped at the scene of the accident,
the witness Averett saw none and detailed that he saw
;none though in a position to see. (R-157, Line 19)

Q. How long was it after you left the scene that
you returned~
A. Long enough for the ambulance to come from
Salina because it passed me in that mile hetween Aurora and the accident.

Q. Just prior to the time that you saw this dust
you indicate two to three ·car lengths south of
the bridge, had any other car- did you observe any other southbound cars~
A. No, sir, not that I can remember.

Q. Did you ohserve whether or not - well from
your position could you observe any cars that
were ·approaching from the southbound from
the north side of the bridge~ ,
A. No.

Q. Was your visibility obstructed in any

way~

A. That's right.

Q. As you approached the bridg-e the cars cOining from the north, it would be on north of
the bridge~
A. To make that :curve and drop over you couldn't
see over that bridge, at least I couldn't. .All
I could see was the Pelly car.
This third motorist, if there was one, was never
produced at trial. Roberts' testimony generally is contrary to, and not sustained by, the physical evidence as
outlined by the investigating 0<fficer who placed the point
1
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of impact on Plaintiff W·alters' side of the road (Exhibit
3, marked with X) (R-185, Line 13), within a foot of
the center of Walters' lane of travel (R-207, Line 21,
Line 30, and R-212, Line 3) with unmistakable marks
from the Pelly car leading from off its right shoulder
.of ·the road, diagonally a;cross the road to its wrong side,
and with no marks discernible from the Walters vehicle
except side skid marks made after impact. (R-185, Liners
21 to 30)
A. Well, at the time. we were making a recheck
there were numerous short stopping marks
made by different vehicles that had eome to
the scene. We found a very short mark made
up to the point of rest of the W·alters' piek:-up,
which showed a side s:k:i!d as the car was turning after the impact. Other than that there
were no discern-able marks a.s to the tire making marks from the Walters' pick-up other
than from markings that evidently that were
made from ·the front wheels as it was pushed
s1de-ways and around a,t the point of impact.
(R-207, Lines 20 to 30)

A. Now ·at a point twenty-four feet north of the
bridge, and four feet west .of center line is
this point of a variation in the travel of this
· curvature to indicate something causing it
· definitely to quickly change its movement .and
. that';s.where this other side sJ]ridding:,/I assume,
and deduct~d, came from the impact and moving sideways of the front wheels of the two
· vehicles, ·so that that would be four feret less
to the center line and twenty-four feet south
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of the north - from the north edge of the
bridge, you see.
(R-212, Lines 16 to 19)

A. No, I didn't make a measurement. I just recall there was distance enough from the point
of impact that I felt it had no conne~ction with
either of these vehicles.
(R-218, Lines 17 to 21)
T~HE

COURT: His testimony is to the effect that
he observed no marks there on his fi.Tst investigation. Late~r on there were these well de-fined skid marks 'Or brake marks, call them
wha£ you please that he noticed, of course,
in the opposite lane or the right lane of the
highway.

(R-22,5, Line 30, R-226, Lines 1-3)

Q. Just one more - Could I have you step to
the board and show me where you saw the
other heavy tire marks1
A. I don't recall at present of the proximity but
they weren't :close enough to be tied in.
Plaintiff Betty Walters testified she did not drive,
has never driven, that her husband owned and paid for
the ·car she was in (R-23), that she was in the front seat
beside her husband, that the other car weaved (R-51,
Line ,2), that she then" ... thought they had it back under
control. We thought they were going to pass us." Cross
examination failed to ·show she was or could be a joint
venturer and chargeable with negligence, if any, of heir
hushand, Harry Walters. (R-70, 71)
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. iS
S.TATE~MENT

OF POINTS

Thrut the ·Court did not commit prejudicial errors as
alleged by Defendant in his Brief, Points I to VI ofDefendant's Brief, and as indexed heretofore; .that the
Defendant had a fair trial and that the _judgment should
be affirmed.
I

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ANSWER. TO POINT I OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF, i.e.
THAT THE OOURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION
17 TO THE JURY, SAID INSTRUCTION BEING A VERDICT
DIRECTING "('FORMULA} INSTRUCTION WHICH DID NOT
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 'l'HE, DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF
THE GAISE.

The instruction is entirely co~rect as to Betty
Walters who Gould not have been contriputJo,riJy negligent, and, open~ td- little -criticism as to Plaintiff Harry
Walters._
:·.,,;
D~efendant-AppeUant at ·trial proposed no· instruction either covering damage·s or enumeratillg alleged
grounds of negligence. Plaintiffs submitted an instruction' on each, Plaintiffs' requested instructions Nos. 11
ad 15, each framed .according to JIFU fonns. The Court
framed · an ·instruction. · covering both damages and
enumerating possible· grounds of negligence, Instruction
No. 17, ;punctuating the same with cautioning language
such rus ". . . the plaintiffs have the burden of proving
by a preponderanee .of the evidence one or more of the
fo.Uowing .. ~" and "The plaintiff has the burden of
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proving by a preponderance of the evidence that one or
more of the acts or omis'Sions designated as A, B, C, D,
an~ E was the efficient a;nd moving c1ause, which in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by arii!J new,
independent cause produced the collision which resulted
in the injuries. Except for a one-paragraph instruction,
No. 16, three preceding instructions, 14, 15, and 15 (a)
were Defendant's requests, proclaiming D·efe:ndant's
theory; No. 14 instructing as to" ... hazard in the event
another vehicle might :approach from the opposite direction and when the view is obstructed upon approaching
within 100 feet of any bridge ...," and that if "Harry
Walters drove to the left of the center . . . as to create
a hazard . . . then Harry Walters was negligent"; Instruction No 15 cautioning that the fact of an accident
does not justify a conclusion of negligence; and Instruction No. 15(a) detailing the grace extended to one confronted with unexpected peril. The following instruction,
No. 18, then detailed that if joint venture was found the
"contributory neg}igence of the plaintiff, Harry Walters,
is imputed to the plaintiff, Betty Walters, and she cannot
recover."
The foregoing would not all go on one page; it was
read and subnritted together; and as given could not have
but f-Ully apprised the jury of both Plaintiffs' ·and Defendant's theory of the case; it is not, in whole or in
part, a formula instruction as that term is generally
used to refer to :an instruction detailing and intending
to detail conditions of recovery; -and c;an hardly be said,
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as stated in Aprpelllant's Brief, Page- ·9~ to have "ignored
completely the Defendant's theory and defense.:''

P~

Ih ·the Morrison ·vs. :Perry case, 104 "Utah 151, 140

2d ·772;· ~ited'bYA:pp:e11ant, the.Shpr~me Co~rt deais

with an eil·ab~'rate ril.ne~qu~~hon in.struetib~, In~truction
No: ·2; notes <it' to be incomplete; in' and of itself, and also
errm~e6us and confu~ir~g,. direCting the jury to asce,rtafu
if certatn 'iten;_s ~.f ·~~glige~~~ were pr~sent, then asKing
them to decide if, in fact, s~ch acts were :negligence,
Court saying:
· ··
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''The jury was told ·that if a person drove his
·ear .in· a certain manner he was negligent, and
also thai- if .he •.drove, his car. i:o, that manner they
-w:ere then to determine whether. or not he. was
:ri~gligent. Thus tlie ju:ry··was· _permitted to decide
tha;t acts·. of negligence a~ a matter of law were
not ·negligence. ·These ::instructions :were .cenffieting .and the giving of such instructiQ·P:~ ~:Il~.titutes
error.. Sqr~~o·!" 1!s. Bell, 5;1 Utah .2~~t 170 f~ 7_2.''
·The Court cites th~ ..fQregoin.g e;rror ~nd at least
fop.:r oth~r separate items as error.; Page 160, "The Court
erred in instructing the•.· jury that .a constant .lookout
would be required"; Page 164, "such examination was
mis'eonduct on the part ro.f·:plaintiff's counsel and is re~
versiqle error,'~ referring to examination of j1;trors; Pag~
166, "Such questioning of the witness by plaintiff's eoun..
sel was misconduct ,and . constitutes .· rever~ible error"
referring to prejudiciaL manner,:of examinll;l.g witness;
Page 167, "We.iconclude.!that an action for the recovery
of :damages for the ·de~truetion:<>f personal property sur-
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vives.- . . . The court erred in sus·t3Jining the general
demurrer"; two of these e·rrors being noted by the court,
not just as error . but "reversible error"; therefoTe, we
wonder if the erroneous instruction above noted in M o·rrison vs. Per.ry womd have alone warranted the new trial,
es-pe'Cially where the evidence was such that on the first
hearing, Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 130, on the evidence as revealed, the Supreme Court's impression was
that, Page 143, "the trial court shohl<i nave granted defendant's motion for dismissal at the close of plaintiff's
testimony."

Morrison v.s. Perry, Supra, cites with approval,
Page 163, Toone vs. J. P. O'Neill Construction Co., 40
Utah 265, 121 P. 10, where the eourt ~vreed defendant
was entitled to have his theory of the case presented in
the instructions, but held that this theory - that the
party injured by blast selected the place he stood, thus
assuming the risk- was adequately presented by the
instruction, "If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff upon his own judgment uninfluenced by any assurance
of safety on the part of defendant's foreman, as to
whether or not the place he was standing at the time
he fired the shot was safe, or if you find that the plaintiff selected the place but he fired the blast without dir~ctions or suggestions of defendant's foreman, then the
defendant is not liable, and you should return a verdict
for the defendant"; that though the ·court might have
charged the jury differently the "appellant's theory of
the evidence was sufficiently covered by what the court
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told the jury, and hence if was·' 'no~t. pr'ejudiced by the
.
court's·; modification refEh~red to.''
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I pie vs. Richar:dson, .9 1Jta.h ?d 5, 336 }>. 2d 781, i13
cited. i.n Appel1anfs. :Bfieft~ ~\lP'£.~rt· of the. s~e id~a.
In~tr~ctiqn ~o .. 17 is· no,tieally:a f'~rm~~'·w~tructio11 as
defined
in .thruf
cas~ beea:11Ee
in .the same. i~·s,f:nictio~~
.
. .
.
..
. .the
.. .
languag~ is. modifie~ py di~yussiq~ o~ "efficienfa.nd mo~
i~g cau~e,". ·''·~o~tiD:u'o~~. ·~~g~~nce. unbrok~n by ·84ly ~ew
indep.enge:U:t dau~e," :;tnd other i,tt,ngua,g~ · modifying, ~he
sa~e. . :Even if it were as eo~s,tructed; it would 9:e: no
grounds for a riew trial as to, ·Betty Walters and :woUld
not besuff~cie:rit grounds.fora n.ew trial.as to the driver
Harry· W.alhjrs';· and·Ivie v.;Richaridson··seeiill.S to make
that ch~ar. The langliage in that case· is. th~t.·su~4. ~n instrii~tio~
"}~
generally:• a. . good
fype
~f' }nst:r:ucti~~
'to
' .
' ·' . · : ,'· •·; "
· .
'
'.
.' '. ' .
.'· ' 1:: : '' '
give," .(Page 11~ Paragraph 3), and although ·tll~· Coru;t
notes that the same i~ in error. t~· that ext~t, ~the. 'court
only found. reversible· ~rror after· noting wany other
grieyous' ~rrors., (Page 12, P.ar~graph '1) ."~f ~~~e'_im
port~n~~ is the e~ror ~ssigned ·in giving instructi~u No:
·io ~ . ':;'; (Page12~ :pa~~~raph·•2) ,;There ~re ·addi.h~npJ
cir~st~~es. in the i~stant case that .are indic~ti~e ~:r
the. fact .tha.t aJ~ir: trittl_ was not had- by th~ D·efend~t.';:;
.and.·~fhgrs .. Th,en the eou,rt reiterated ··a note it h~s fr~quen.tly. so.nnded, P:~g~ 13, Par.agraph. 3._: .. "The''·ri~r(}rs
-rJ
must be real and substantial and suc]l. as ,may reaspn,., ..
.abiy.he ,suppo~~~d ~~·~ld affect' the _"r~esult.'' .·. . "..
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Defenda:nt could have at. trial,· but· did not, submit
interrogatories,1eaviR&" .ihe. Court to

or_ r,equest. speeial
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frame general . instructions;. which it did, and the language ·in Instruction 17, "unbroken by any new indedendent cause,"= etc., was · as effective in modifying
Inst-ruction·17 as would have"been the insertion of. such
words as· "unleHs you also find contributory negligence
on ·the part 'of Plaintiffs"; and the latter language was
·unnecessary as· to Betty Walters and her cause of action
and would have certainly rendered: Instruction 17 acceptable to the most critical as to Plaintiff Harry Walters
and his cause of action.
It does not seem reasonable that Instruction 17 must
have, in order to convey its plain English meaning to
eiglitintelligent men, also be interpolated with language
on ilnm.ediate trazard where the··same is almost immedui:tely previously oovered.

In· n:~dd vs. 4irway Mo·tor Coach Lines, Inc., 104:
Utah 9, 137 P. 2d 374, where a bus driver drove onto a
la~ to ·avoid a bicyclist emerging from a driveway, the
court. . said:

"We are frank to say that some portions of
· the instructions are not models, but the alleged
:· incompleteness· ·of some instructions was covered
· by giying :others. The cha;rge to the jury must be
consi~er,ed as an !integral whole.· ... "

.. :·.4,8tar~in vs., Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834,
.the court, ~ nil!ing on an assignment of error in the
instructions said :
"It seems unnecessary and inadvisable to treat
in detail the assigned errors telating to the. giving
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-·

·! 2.

,, · ·

' arid refusaJ. to give instruct~ons. The instructions
·should ·not be -susceptible of; :mis·eOlTSll"llGtion as
· either·. emnnJ.e:p,ts .oru the· e:vide:n'G(f; Of'J,argum.en~s
:for~~thyl; si~e ~fJ.h~ ease. It-w~~·the du;ty,ot the
• court t~ .CJ9!Y~r the theories ·of_ both: ~arti@s ;in ·his
·instructions. 'Martineau v·s~·'Ha1is-O·#, 47: Utah {)49,,
H>5"P~ :432_; :MeDonald ·v.:s·.~ ·'Union: Pac·if.ic R.· ·Oo;,
.:~09 .~.Utah ,493, :J-67 P... 2d 6.85. ·If. the instr-uctions
are •. ,<?,On$iqere.~; a~,:.'. a · wl,l.ole,. ·as ·they; m~y 1 he,
w,alke:nhorst V$,. Ir esler, ~-2 Utah 312, 67 P. 2d

.' '654; .R_e.dd vs.· Airway Mbtor. Cbach Lines~; 104
Utah 9, 137 P~ 2d .37 4, the ·CJorurt ad~·quately dis.charged ·this duty and.fairly presented the issues

-:: ···; :·ta: tlie1 jury."

.

·· -

· ·

· ·· · ·

f N ~ie that'Def~~d~t~i;i}~n~~t'-~seif-"sub~tt;d

~
~o~~alled. fo~t1fa' ins~~~ti.~~ D~fendant's .r~·qu~st~~· -~~

st;Jcflon No.' 1~( the· .'same' llO't' cont~Iting ~11' conditions
. ; . ·.. ... ·. ; : '';; l " '! ' . •· 1•. '
necessary to invoke the 0onclusion therein, that is/" ...
then H·~ry Walters· was· n~glig~nt ~~!ld if yo-u find his
nyglige-l}Ce.·w~s t;he proximate, cause of'the\collision~you
must. -return .. a .verdict· in" :f'avor ·of tli~ "aefendant :·and
agaihst the. plaintiffs nOr. cause· of action'''; fror 'illi;tanee;
one cqrtditiol1 necessary to make the sa#li.J~ntirely pal~t,a;ble wouJd. have ,p,e~n_ t~· ;a9:d, .")lowe~.eli; ·yo~Jp.ay ·still
find .·in favor of· Plaintiff·oBe.tty, Wailter~~·--and•;against
D·efendant unless yo-li' also· find the riegligenc~~ O:f Harry
wauers 'be llie .sole ,~-roximate
o:ft1e ·aooident;
\the· i~~t~clio~ eo~~d~ be,.
-~t~~r;~lat~d ·with
language· on joint-venture, if-joint venture wa,s, an issue
(and:~we· b~Heve it w~s- n~~t). This instruction; ·however,
when ·:r·e~d With the in'~trugtiqn_s'a~ a whole, like Instruc,: ....:1C ..
;'_::7
tiO'll lT;;t~ ~~read, CJQU~~noi.be misleading. . ~;;:.'t,~,~
<

to

ahd.

<- ..

.~.'y'.l'ltp,r,

qa,use

further
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POINT II
<ANSWER-·rro· APPELLANTS POINT--NO~-ll,'te. THAT
THE COURT -ERRED IN RE-FUSING ,TO INSTRUCT THE

JUR:X.- -IN _ ·AOCORD~NCE. WITH -pEFENDANT'S -REQUESTED ~NS~:Jlll'~'!'ION NO. 13, ~ELA:rJNG _TO THE
STA'.J.'UTORY DUTY OF A. DRIVER .OPERATING A VEHICLE. TO -THE -LEFT' OF .THE: CEN'TER. OF THE HIGHWAY
IN OVERTAKING AND -~PASSING ANOTHER VEHICLE
TRAVELING IN THE S,AME DIRE,CTION.

D~fendant subnutted two lengthy instructions, De·re~dant'·s request No. 13 and No. 14, detailing Plaintiff's
·duty to stay on his own Side of the road, and Plaintiffs
submitted instructions as to Defendant's.-s-ame duty. The
Oourt·framed instructions relating to each driver's duty
in this ·regard, Instruction No. 10, Instruction 11 at Part
(e), ;and Instruction 14.
1

Instruction No. 10: Section 57-7-121, Utah
Code, 1943, which was in effect at the time of the
accident involved in this ·case, provides as follows :
"Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right, ·and upon
roadways having width for not more than one
lane of traffic in each direction, drivers shall give
to the~ther at least one-half of the main traveling
portion of the roadway as nearly as possible."
· · Instruction No. 11: It was the duty of the
plaintiff and the defendant each to use reasonable
care tiilder the' 'circumstances in driving his automobile to'avoid danger to himself and· others and
and to observe and to be aware of the conditions
of the highway, the traffic thereon, and to observe
due care -in respect to ". . . (c) t'o drive his auto~
mobile on his own right side of the highway.... "
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Instruction No. 14: You are instructed by the
statutes of Utah that no vehicle shall at ·any time
be driven to the left side of the roadway when
approaching the crest u.f a grade, or upon a curve
in ·the highway where the driver's vie·w is obstructed with such distance, as to create a hazard
in the ervent another vehicle might approach from
the opposite direction, and when the view is obstructed upon approaching within 100 feet of any
bridge, if you find from the preponderance of the
evidence in this case that Harry Walte~rs drove fo
the· left of the center o.f the roadway upon approaching the crest o:f a grade or upon a curve
in the highway ;and where his view was obstructed
within such a diS'tance .as to create a hazard, when
the automobile driven by Mrs. Pelly was approaching from the opposite direction, then Harry
·Walters was negligent, and if -you find his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision,
you musrt return a verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs, No· Cause of
Action.
With the. foregoing, especially the command in Instruction 14 th;at "If -you find from a preponderance of
the evidence in this case thart Harry Walters drove the
left of the eerrter o:f the roadway ... as to create a hazard
when the automobile driven by Mrs. Pelly was approaching from the opposite direction, then Harry Walters was
negligent, and if you find his negligence was .the proximate cause of the collision you must return a verdict in
favor of the defendant and .against the plaintiffs, No
Gause of .Act:i!on" it does not seem Defendant needed the
request No. 13 and No. 14, nor that the jurors needed
s.ueh in. order to fairly and intelligently weigh the evi-
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dence. Certainly as to Plaintiff Betty Walters and her
·c.ause of action Defendant was not .treated unf.airly by
these instructions.

Beckstrom vs. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P. 2d
309, cited by Defendant in his Brief, rules error, a}ong
with other items, for failure of the court to submit Defendant's last clear chance theory. We have no quarrel
with the ruling of law therein.
Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834,
also cited by Defendant, is a case where plaintiff sues the
executor for services to the deceased. It rules correctly
that a party is entitled to have his theory covered, but
rules that general coverage only is necessary, the court
saying, with regard to the general instrnctions given relating to defendant's theory of the case ·and certain cautionary instructions : " ... the instructions should not be
susceptible of misconstruction as either comments on
the evidence or ·arguments for either side of the case ....
It was the duty of the court to cover the theories of both
parties in his instructions. . . . If the instructions are
considered as a whole, as they must be, . . the court
adequately discharged this duty and fairly presented the
issues to the jury.... "
The coU!rt further said in that case·:
"We must keep uppermost in mind the provision orf our 'Statute, Section 104-14-7, U. C. A.
1943 'the ~ourt must . . . disregard any error ...
which does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties, and no judgment shaH be reversed
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See Rule 61, U. R. C. P. to the same effect. Before
the appellant is entitled to prevail, he must show
both error and prejudice ; that is, that his su~
stantial rights are affected .and that there is at
least a fair likelihood that the result would have
been different.... "
Section 104-14-7, U. C. A. 1943, has been replaced
by Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which read·s
as follows:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or ·order or in anything done or omitted
by the court or by any of the parties, is ground
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or -order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage o~ the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (Compiler's Notes. This
Rule is based on former sections. 104-14-7 :and
104-39-:-3 (Code 1943) both of which were repealed
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, Art. 3. The first ~f the
forme;:r sections related· to error in any ·stage of
the proceedings, while the latter former section
related to consideration of error on appe:a~l.)
Instruction No. 14 .as given may be open to the
eriticism of not including all of the propositions and
possibilities eovered in D·efendant's requests N~o. 13. and
No.14. In this regard, a headnote from Morgan vs. Mammoth Mining Company, 26 Utah 174, 72 P. 688, is pertinent and reads as follows :
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· Where a charge, considered as a whole, states
law .applicable. to case 'fairly an~ correctly, fact
4h~t 'One paragraph of charge, abstractly con., · ' sidered, does not stt;l.te law with absolute precision
i'! ·
-·doe-s ·not ·constitute 'rever_sible error.
·
. 'i.

A: headnote from In re Richards' Est.ate, 5 Utah 2d
106, 297 P. 2d 542, annotated under Rule 61, Utah Rules
&f·Civil Procedure, is als'o relevant. It rea·ds: · ,. ! ' · -Refusal. to give an instruction cannot be the
basis for reversal -unless the jury was insufficiently advised of the issue they wer.e to determine, or it appears that they would have been
confused or misled to the prejudice of the person
complaining thereof.
- Certainly-Btartin vs. Madsen does not rule that the
statute, there the_ Dead Man's Statute, need be read to
the jucy. While in a proper case the statute may be and
should be read; tp.e practice:may as weill be error :~s ruled
in Shields vs. Utah Light & Traction Co., 99 Utah 307,
105 P. 2d 347. It is more general to refer to _the law
or rule as encompassed by the statute such as contemp:~ated in JIFU No. _80.16, and prefacing such statutory
or 'Q:fdinance rules with such language as "The Federal
S~fety Appliance Act required that . . ., or ·provides
that ... -or impo-ses .... " Here numerous statutory rules
were involved but co;vered by the general instructions,
i:e. lookout, "control, road conditions, Instrnction No. 9;
passiig to the right, yielding half of road to other· car,
mstructio,if' No. --10; reasonable· care, control, right side
of highwaf; speed1 Instruction No. 11; left side. of road'
where driver's view obstructed, Within one· hundred feet
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of bridge, approaching crest of hill, "when the auto
driven by Mrs. Pelly approaching from the opposite direction ...," Instruction No. 14; each or more of which
items might have been, but need not be, co:vered by reading a seciion of the Utah Code. Paragraph 1, Reid's
Bransons Instructions to Juries, Article 100, Page 289,
reads:
·:I.

"In most cases it is not deemed improper for
the court to read or quote the pertinent statute.
In ·some .cases mere quotation is insufficient. An
instruction on alleged negligence in violation 9f
a statute shou1d tell a jurywhat conduct amounts
to such violation and not merely quote the ·statute.

"

and at Page 291: "At least one court .has already declared that the court c:an substitute language of its own
choosing equivalent to the terms of tl1.e stature." .C~.ting
Morris: vs. Fizw.ater, 187 Oregon 191,. 210 P. 2d 104
(rear-end auto collision case), which case in turn cites
a sauthority Haag vs. Washilngton and Oregon Corporaition, Oregm:t 144 P. 574, whe·re the court in commenting
on the lengthy reading of the employer's liability act
said:
"Reading the law, at length to -the jury was
likely to involve it in a determinati9n of questions
_ _ ..
not relating directly to the issues.''
Ramdall's I nstr~ctions to Juries, Art. 409~ reads as fol,.
lows:
" . . . In~tructions which corre·ctly set .forth a
rule of law embodied in a statute are not erroneous because they do not use the exact language."
(Citing seiVeral cases)
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POINT III
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT III, i.e .. THAT ·THE
TRIAL QOUR;T ERREP IN SUBMIT'TlNG TO THE JURY
TliE. QUES.TION OF DEFENDANT'S SPEED AS . NEGLI-

QENQE.

"

- The Court did instruct the jury, Instruc:tion No. 11,
that it was the· duty of, not just the Defendant, -as indicated ~n Appellant's Brief, Page 25, Paragraph 2, but
"the duty of the· Plaintiff and the Defendant ... " to use
reasonable care . . . with respect to speed, that is 4'to
drive ~a_.t su~h ~peed as was safe, reasonable, and prudent
under the circumstances having due regard to· the_ width,
surface, and condition 10.f the highway, the traffic thereon,
th~ .visibility- and any arctual or potential hazards. then
existing." We know from the record that some of these
pote~tial hazards included the rise in the highway, the
curve ill the rhad, the bridge, the growth of vegetati9n
along the highway, and the oncoming traffic. The speed
limit ~ould. not neces~arily be such speed as was· "safe,
reasonable, and prudent under the circumstances." T~e
evidence, however, includes evidence of excessive speed,
.and· s·ome ;of which evidence could be interpreted by the
jury as evidence of speed in excess of the limit, that is,
siXty miles per hour, and all of which is evidence -~£ speed
e.x:~s~iv~ for the conditions.· The evidence is that the
Pelly vehicle had passed an· automobile~ that of A.verett
proceeding ·around fifty miles per hour and de·p:arted
from ·the ·same by appro·ximately a mile at one time.
Averett lla<Ltold the officer he was ~oling the maximum
when passed by the Pelly automobile·~ (R-201, Line 126)
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The evidence as a whole indicates that the Pelly vehicle,
when it struak the shoulder of the road, ·as testified to
by Averett "veered sharpJy off the road so the wheels
got ·off the shoulder there ·and it made a sharp turn· and
shot across the bridge." Betty Walters testified that
the Pelly c.ar "weaved" (R-51, Line 1) and caused dust
to fly (R-47, 48). The Pelly vehicle tire marks furthe~r
indicated that vehicle was out of C'Ontrol. The jury coufd
conclude under the circumstances that this was a result
of excessive speed. The speed of the Pelly vehicle was
such that the Walters vehicle, itself traveling forty-five
miles per hour (R-108, Line 21), was knocked backward
ten fee.f "(-R-188, Line 7). The photographs are further
evidence of the amount of speed involved, and the jury
could make certain legitimate inferences therefrom.

In Hunter vs. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242, 198 P. 2d
245, cited by Appellant, the court correctly ruled that
submission of speed was erroneous, but this was because
of la.ck of evidence and in f'act where all the .evidence
on the question was of moderate speed the court saying:
"The appellant cites as prejudicial the giving
of such instruction for the reas•on that there was
not eviderwe adduced to the effect that her car was
being operated at an excessive or unreasonable
rate of speed, or in violation of the cited statute.
She points out that plaintiff offered no competent
evidence of any excessive speed, that she in f'act
testified that she did not !know how fast defendant's car ·was traveling. Defendant testified that
she w.as going less than 25 niiles per hour, and the
officer testified that at the ·point where the brakes
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w~.re

applied, the speed was from. 20 to 22 miles
pe:r hour.

. ·\ "The evid~nce shows that there were relatiyely
few cars ·on the street at that time of night, anq
there was· no evj.dence of any pedestrian traffic
, ,c:rq~sing· the. str~et other than pJ~tiff. ~here
being .a post~d speed .limit of 25 mile~ pe~ hour,
no' .evidence was presented to show ~hat at .tp.a~
time the traffic was heavy enough to require a
lesser speed .to be reasonable. There :is lacking
ail.y evidence which would show that a speed of
20 to 25 miles per hour. w.as excessive or unreason~ble. We ·think the evidence not such as ·to
· justify giving an instruction· ·on the spe~¢! of defendant's ·car~ The evidence clearly indicates that
the negligence of defenant, if any, wa8 ~failing
to lreep such a lookout ahead as to see plaintiff in
time to have avoided striking her."
·· Itjs diff~~ult to see how the general language in the
instructions with respect to speed could be prejudicial,
even· if the· C!()futt -accepts Appellant's view that the same
was' error. In Hunt V's. P .. J. Moran, Inc~, 46 Utah 388,
15p P. 953, the Court pointed out that an instruction,
th!o-ugh.- not founded upon issues and proof, is not ground
for~ reversal if ~nonprejudicial.
A viewing by the. jury of the scene o.f the accident,
and the photographs, together with hearing the ·evidence
~esp~ting tire marks, etc., ought· to entitle the jury to
d.r~w' .·oo~ai~ conclusions with respect to the speed of
the.Pelly. vehicle.
··I
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POINT IV
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT IV, i.e. THAT THE
COURT ERRED IN: RE'FUSING TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7, WHICH
INSTRUCTION ENOOMP ASSED THE DEFENDANT'S
THEORY OF THE CASE TH.A:T THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLAINTIFF CREATED AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, AND
WHICH THEORY WAS SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT,
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Defendant's requested Instruction No. 7 was:
If you find from the evidence in this case, that
Harry Walters was driving on the left side of the
highway as the car driven by Harry Walters and
Mrs. Pelly approached each other, and if this
driving on the left side of· the highway by Harry
W altei·s resulted in an emergency, which caused
Mrs. Pelly to turn to the left and resulted in the
collision, that said turning to .the· left side o;f the
highway by Mrs. Pelly would not constitute negligence on her part, and she would not he negligent
for turning to the left, if the turning was a result
·of the hazard created-by Harry Walters~
We submit this instruction as requested was incomplete -and if given should be interpolated with lan·guage concerning the reasonable man test as modified
by the alleged sudden peril and reduced accountability
allowed because thereof.
Three cases cited by. Defendant in his Brief, Morris on vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 Pac. 2d 772; Beckstrom
vs. Williams, 282 P. 2d 309, 3 Utah 2d 210; and Startin
vs. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834, as they relate
to Defendant's contention regarding the theory of his
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case, we have commented on in this Brief heretofore
under Point No. I and Point No. II.
After the Court instructed the jury as to the duty

of both drivers with respect to vigilance, road conditions,
control, .ability to. sto-p, the prudent driver te:st (Instruction No. 9); duty to drive to the right,· leaving the 'Other
half of the road open (Instruction No. 10); reasonable
care, duty to observe, lookout, speed (Instruction No.
11); the Court, Instruction No.14, detailed that if "Harry
Walters drove to the left of the center of the roadway
... within such a distance as to cre·ate a hazard, when
the auto driven by Mrs. Pelly was approaching from the
opposite direction, then Harry Walters was negligent,
and if you find his negligence was the proximate cause
of. the collision you must return a verdict in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiffs, No Cause of
Action."
This was followed with a sentence, Instruction No.
15, Defendant's request No. 5, diluting the impact as
against D·efendant of the fact of an accident, and then
followed with Instruction 15 (a) on "unexpectedly confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence
·ot·the appearance of imminent danger...."
Can anyone really doubt that the jury knew Defendant contended Plaintiff Harry Walters "drove to the
left of the center ...," "as to create a hazard ... " and
thai· Defendant was ''... unexpectedly confronted with
peril. ..." (quoted verbatim from Instructions 14 and
15 (a) Y
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As to Plaintiff Betty Walters; Instructi:on No 14
was, in fact, heavily weighted in favor of Defendant, if
we are correC!t that she was not capable of contributory
negligence.
POINT V
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT V i.e. THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE'FENDANT'.S REQUESTED INST·RUCTION NO. 3, WHICH INSTRUCTION SET FORTH THE STATUTORY RULE AS TO
THE NATURE.: OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED WHEN THE
TORT FE.AJSOR IS DEAD.
1

D.efendant's requested Instruction No. 3 as submitted
re.ads as f oHOlWs :
The plaintiffs, Harry W·aJ.ters and Betty
Walters, cannot recover judgment against the
estate of Barbara Best Pelly except upon some
competent satisfactory evidence other than their
own testimony. The pJaintiffs, H-arry Walters
and Betty Walters, have the burden of proving,
by some other competent s~tisfactory evidence,
other than their own testimony,_ that Barbara Best
Pelly wrus negligent in one or more of the· particulars set forth in these instructions ·and that
such negligence was the proximate cause
their
injury and damage, if any. If plaintiffs have not
proved b~ some other competent evidence, o~her
than their own testimony, that Barbara Best Pelly
was negligent, as set forth in the instructions, and
that such negligence, if any, was a proximate
cause .of the collision, then plaintiffs cannot. recover and your verdict must be in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiffs, No Cause
of Action.

of
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The refusal to give this instruction was simply and
~o~rec~y a ruling as a matter of law by the Court that
there was other competent evidence other than the Plaintiff's own testimony. The physical evidence placed the
Pelly vehicle on its wrong side of the road - could reasonable minds differ as to the existence of "competent
satisfactory evidence."
The case, Fretz vs. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.
2d 642, cited by Defendant in his Brief as authority· for
alleged error in not submitting the instruction in ques:.
tion does not say nor indicate that such an instruction
should be given. This case apparently concedes, as we
contend, that the statute in question, 78-11-12, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, forces Plaintiff to prove his case by
evidence other than his own testimony, an~ on failure
t<>- so do suffer a ruling .as a matter of law by the Court
of nonsuit. Plaintiffs Harry Walters and Betty Walters
apparently proved their case adequately and almost
wholly by "evidence other than the testimony of said
injured pel'lsons," since they were precluded by application of the Dead Man Statute to this accident from testifying at all as to the actual accident, the same deemed
by~he 00fUI't a "transaction equally within the knowledge
of. the witness and the deceased" under the Dead Man
Statute.
. ·Traditionally, would not the question of whether
there was "some competent satisfactory evidence other
than the testimony o;f said injured person," be one for
the Court and not the jury~
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Other cases touching on the sa.~d statute, 78-11-1~,
Utah 'Code Annotated, 1953, are also not authority for
the alleged error. Meads vs. Dibblee, 10 Utah 2d 229,
350 P. 2d 853; ULR, Volume 7, Page 362; Meacham vs.
Allen, v Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285. In that case, the Court
in dealing with a presumption said: "The question of
whether a prima facie case has been made is the same
here as in all other c:ases a questi~on for the court and
not for the jury to determine." In the instant ~ase, if
Plaintiffs had not survived the evidentiary obstacle in
78-11-12, they would have failed to make a prima facie
case and the issues thus earlier resolved.
~Furthermore,

once the Oorurt by invoicing the
Dead Man Statute limited the evidence by Plaintiffs of
the accident to evidence other than their own testimony,
would it not have been error to let the jury speculate on
whether ·such evidence was either "competent" or "satisf.aetory" or "other than the tesimony of said injured
person." At le:ast ~such ruling on the applicability of the
Dead Man Statute made such instruction, Defendant's
request No. 3, unnecessary and superfluous if not error.
POINT VI
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S POINT VI, i.e. THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING REPETITIOUS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PREJUDICIALLY EMPHASIZED
PLAINTIFF'S 'THEORY OF RECOVERY IN THE CASE.

Defendant eontends Instruction 1, explaining Plaintiff's claim, Instruction No. 11 concerning the duties of
both Plaintiffs and Defendant, and Instruction No. 17
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which was a combination damage and "if you :find" instruction overemphasized Plaintiff~s' claim.
If we concede that the rules of the road are ,appro:ximately the same as they relate to each of the two autos
approaching head-on, how can it be said that Instruction
No. 11, commencing "It was the duty o.f the Plaintiff and
Defendant each to ..." and ending "Failure of the Plaintiff or the Defendant ... " .as in Plaintiff's favor~
Regarding Instruction No 1, the Court could do little
else but instruct on Plaintiffs' claim in order to detail
what i~·sues had been raised by the pleadings, and the
instruction covers the issues raised in the ple1adings by
bo·th parties ·although Defendant in his Brief, Page 31,
sets out only part of this instruction. Reid's Bransons
Instrwctions to Juries, Volume 1, Page 285, reads:
"... it is not error to incorporate a short concise statement of a party's position as found in the pleadings,"
citing among other c,ases Taylor vs. Weber County, 4
Utah 2d 328, 293 P. 2d 925, which case in turn cites
Brwner vs. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d 649, and
the statement therein, "There is nothing inherently erroneous in reading the pleadings in order to present the
issue...." D.avis vs. Heifner, 54 Utah 428, 181 P. 5B7,
holds in general that the stating of issue.s by the trial
court to the jury in language of the pleadings instead
of giving a concise statement in its own language is not
prejudicial e·rror where the issues were simple and not
involved. Regarding Instruction No. 17, the s.ame· see1ns
necesS'ary in order to let the jury ~mow when and how
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Plaintiffs shoruld make out such 1ssues, if at all The
necessity ·of such an instruction is apparent. The propriety of tllis particular one is discussed under Point No.
I.

Shields vs. Utah Light & Traction Company, 99 Utah
307, 105 P. 2d 347, cited by Defendant, is hardly helpful.
rrhere the trial court read in its instructions pleadings
comprising ". . . ten printed pages of the abstract.",
Page 309, " •.. portions of the eity or.dinance to be Tead
to the jury as well .as certain identical sections of the
statute in addition to having the court (further on in the
instruction) repeat these laws in substance- togelther with
an explanation of just how these propositions were to
be applied to the facts," Page 313 The repetition was
held to be _unnecessary and was gross, and even then
only deemed prejudicial error when weighed with several
other apparently substantial errors. In De.Vine vs. Cook,
3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P. 2d 1073 (1955) cited by Defendant,
the court found "It was error to instruct the jury on an
issue of contributory negligence of certain_ plaintiffs
(~rs. Gusinda and lVlr,s. DeVine)," that "the court's instructions regarding contributory negligence were ep.·on~
eous ·and prejudiGial," that "the trial court co_ffi.I¢tted
error in refusing to grant the motion of the defendant,
W. S. !-latch Company, for a directed. v-erdict." . The
Supreme Court detailed the. innocuous nature of instructions 5, 7, 8, .and 9, in eonjunctio:J?- with instructio_ns 1 to
4, saying "It can readily be seen that the instructions
accentuated the duty ·oif the plaintiffs and mini:ri4zed the
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duty of the defendants." In re,ading s.aid instructions,
we have no quarrel with the decision and agree with the
criticisms and the principles laid down therein, but fail
to find an analogy to the instructions being considered
here.
Considering the dual nature of Instruction No. 1
(part :om.ly set out in Defendant's Brief), an!d the dual
nature.of Instruction No. 11 defining the duties of headon drivers having similar duties, we are re:aJ.ly only eonfronted With the propriety of Instruction No. 17 earlier
dis·c:ussed. As noted earlier, th.at instruction, Instruction
No.17, may he open to criticism, though we believe not of
a prejudicial nature, as to Plaintiff Harry W·alters, but
certainly not as to Plaintiff Betty .Walters.
CONCLUSION
Instructions in any case in the clear vision of hindsight can be improved. Trial exigencies usually leave
inadequate time for perfection in composition. Lengthy,
unnecessary, and duplicitous requests further encroach
on the Court's time. Failure of counsel to insist, even
where objections are reserved until after the jury retires,
on instructions deemed important, may amount to permissive error. All things considered, however, the one
most qualified to instruct the jury, and to determine later
if a new trial should be had, in light of the problems
there at hand and having heard and seen a;s well as re:ad
the testimony of the witne sses, is, and is presumed to be,
the trial judge.
1
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The contentions of both sides were in plain English
made clear; the claim of Defendant of emergency was
forcefully put and could not have been misunderstood.
Instruction No. 17 is correct as to the passenger, Plaintiff
Betty Walters, and not prejudicial as to the driver,
H.arry Walters. Speed was a legitimate area otf instruction. Competent eyidence other· than from Plaintiffs'
testimony did as a matter of law ~ot only. exist b~t is
conceded. (Appellant's Brief, Page 10, Paragraph 1).
M:atters were fully aired, the jury fully and· .fairly .ap~
prised, and Defendant had a fair trial.
· Respectfully submitted,
GAYLE D·E:AN HUNT ·
Continental Bank Building
.Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Resppndents .
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